Post-Modern Rule of Law by Máthé, Gábor
226
Civic Review, Vol. 15, Special Issue, 2019, 226–236, DOI: 10.24307/psz.2020.0212
Gábor Máthé
Post-Modern Rule of Law
Summary
In this paper the classical rule of law, born in the 19th century, is compared to the current 
post-modern rule of law through the opinion of the author and of the relevant interna-
tional experts. The paper focuses on nation states’ sovereignty, the settlement of jurispru-
dential problems between the European Union and its Member States, the elimination 
of anomalies in the post-modern rule of law, as an ultimate guarantee, the constitutional 
courts of nation states and the Conference of European Constitutional Courts.
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Classical Rule of State in the 19th Century
Balance in the first half of the past two hundred years was based on the principles of 
military alliance, settled territorial arrangements and cooperation between the three 
founders of the Holy Alliance: Tsar Alexander I of Russia, Emperor of Austria and 
King of Hungary Francis I, and King Frederick William III of Prussia. In the history 
of Europe the initiatives taken by great powers were accompanied by illustrious con-
gresses. Among them, of paramount significance was the 19th-century Congress of Vi-
enna, as it successfully managed international crises up to 1914 (Harmat, 2015). The 
simultaneous enforcement of the three requirements was the token of the continent’s 
success. Legitimacy, or in other words, the exercise of power through inheritance or 
elections, and then the alliance of stated in equilibrium was the criterion, and ulti-
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mately, responsibility for the future always predominated in conflict resolution. In the 
first one hundred years after the congress, a new order evolved. Legitimacy was pro-
claimed in opposition to the ideas of the French Revolution, and primarily monarchic 
and dynastic solidarity were manifest in this restoration going against the revolution. 
Moreover, this power was Christian: it was built in an alliance between the throne and 
the altar, and could finally remain continental (Máthé, 2015a).
However, once it was realised that the interests had changed, by the 1860’s the al-
liance began to gradually incorporate the power policy principles built on fundamen-
tally new ideas, and first and foremost it recognised the need to create the rule of law. 
The two basic pillars of the rule of law is freedom and the sacredness of property: 
and in the triad of state, society and the individual person, it is an essential require-
ment that institutions are established to control the exercise of power. The early con-
cept of the rule of law was a summary of the desires cherished by political liberalism: 
the ruler’s subjection to positive law, the submission of state activity to law, and the 
prevention of using the formal opportunities inherent in legislation and execution 
for unlawful intervention in citizens’ fundamental rights.
In the state that evolved, a compromise was made to the benefit of a formal state. 
According to the Viennese professor Ogris, the nature of the rule of law secures the in-
tegrity of law and order and not its content. The essence of the state is that through law 
it determines and unalterably ensures the trajectory and limits of its own operation, and 
the breathing room for its citizens. As he put it, directly, in its capacity as a state, the state 
should not reach beyond the scope of law in implementing moral ideas. It became clear 
that the retention of the elbowroom for certain legal titles, legal protection and judges 
has a stabilising and financially beneficial effect. Thus, politicians’ interest became fo-
cussed on the results to be achieved, and formal legal protection became a central issue 
especially in the field of state administrative affairs. In Werner Ogris’s witty wording: 
The idea of the rule of law drifted apart from the theory of the state and vigorously 
jumped over to administrative law and the academic discipline of public administration 
(Ogris, 2010, p. 23). This is because the crucial question was the enforcement of rights 
in practice. In response to this the compulsion of control over public administration was 
born, aptly expressed in Otto Mayer’s opinion that the rule of law is the state of a well-
organised public administrative law. Consequently, in 1896, the priority institution of le-
gal protection, the Administrative Court, was also established in Hungary, and thus the 
citizens’ protection against the unlawful measures taken by the state was manifest in a 
specific form. This was subsequently completed by other corner-stones like the division 
of power, the independence of judges and the system of fundamental rights, in place 
for several generations now. Submission of the classical power triad to law was ensured 
by great legislations: in addition to our commercial act, proposals that represented out-
standing achievements in the codification of private law, the code of civil procedure, 
and the masterpiece of criminal law, the criminal code named Csemegi Code after its 
maker, which served several generations of lawyers in dealing with the facts. 
The dual monarchy that evolved in Eastern and Central Europe in the 19th cen-
tury comprised two independent countries: Austria and Hungary. They had com-
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mon affairs and joint organisations to handle them. As a multi-cultural entity that 
had an incredible geographical diversity, the Monarchy put the principles of the 
Holy Alliance into practice, successfully established the full range of the institutions 
required for the division of power and created the codes carrying European legal 
values (Sári, 1995; Máthé, 2015b). In a characterisation of the Monarchy, it is impor-
tant to highlight that the system of law had priority and the economy unfolded with-
in this framework. Basically due to its social motivation, between 1870 and 1914 the 
economy operating with the predominance of local markets resulted in a new, bour-
geois lifestyle. The economy of the dualist Monarchy may be a notable example, as 
the budgetary ratio of pragmatic affairs was 70:30, and after a few changes, for the 
last time in 1908 it reached 63.6 to 36.4 to the detriment of the countries under the 
imperial council (Balogh, 2007). Consequently, the Hungarian sovereign benefited 
from economic efficiency. In the assessment of Eisenmann, a French historian, with 
the 1867 Compromise, Hungary was granted half of all the rights for a third of the 
costs, and obtained two-thirds of the influence in the Monarchy (Eisenmann, 1904).
Fredric Jameson, a significant contemporary US thinker, provided a highly perti-
nent assessment of the Monarchy in a postmodern cultural frame of mind. Among 
others, this is important because in our time theories are only created about the con-
ditions of opportunities in our period, and they merely include lists of changes and 
transformations. Jameson endeavours to change by thinking of something in a histori-
cal perspective in an age when the method of understanding the present from the 
past has already been forgotten. “...the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in any way a 
nightmare. On the contrary, besides being the last of the old archaic empires, it was 
also the first multinational and multi-ethnic state: comfortably inefficient when com-
pared with Prussia, humane and tolerant when juxtaposed with the czars; finally not a 
bad arrangement at all, and an intriguing model in our own postnational period, still 
riven by nationalisms” (Jameson, 1991, p. 316).
The postmodern rule of law in our days
The procedure of implementing the basic principles of the rule of law has never 
been seamless: either in the period of establishment or today. It is important to note 
that the rule-of-law model is far from being a closed system, and as such it needs to 
be constantly developed. Nothing guarantees that its achievements will last forever. 
This is well illustrated by the European Union in the 21st century. This is because 
the Member States struggle helplessly in the grip of the common and the individual 
systems of political institutions, as the situation has been characterised by the former 
President of the European Parliament, adding that in Europe, sovereignty is based on 
the separation of powers: we have a government Parliament can decide against, and 
an independent judiciary that controls compliance with the law.
At the beginning of the 20th century the Treaty of Versailles that closed World 
War I, upset the territorial order and destabilized Central Europe. After World War 
III, with the Yalta Conference and the subsequent Treaty f Paris, Europe set out on 
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the way to becoming Transatlantic and gradually losing its global political influence. 
Then the Treaty of Malta, signed on 2 December 1989, reintegrated Central and East-
ern Europe and represented a completely new standard of quality, as these areas were 
required to return to the political and economic relations laid down in the 20th-cen-
tury Roman Treaties in the spirit of the Washington Consensus, mediated by the USA.
In a world that had become unipolar, the integration of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope departed even more from the previous established principles. The order of el-
ements included in the Washington Consensus, namely, privatisation, deregulation 
and commercial liberalisation, was implemented on the basis of the scenario created 
by the international finance. The reason was that the creators of the programme 
failed to distinguish the various dimensions of statehood and the ways they relate to 
economic development. Privatisation resulted in enormous asymmetries and the state 
was supposed to correct them. Milton Friedman, the most excellent representative 
of free-market economics, aptly noted that the tenet has been proven: legal order is 
probably more essential than privatisation (Gecsényi and Máthé, 2009, pp. 16–18).
The correlations between these international processes are described by academi-
cian and professor of economics, Dr. Béla Kádár in a highly edifying assessment. His 
clear establishment of the facts is self-explanatory: “The international climate in which 
Europe’s destiny was shaped by powers outside Europe for half a century evolved in 
the wake of two self-destructive world wars of the 20th century (and Europe’s civil 
war): in Yalta, according to Soviet, and in Malta, in December 1989, according to 
American interests. The conditions and duties of the change of regime were deter-
mined from outside. This was a fundamental factor that shaped the elbowroom,... 
however, in this conceptual determination, closing the gap by granting financial sup-
port to the countries of Central Europe was not a strategic goal.”
Although in the 1990’s “the IMF was given the control panel to set the latitude in 
the economic transformation of the former socialist countries,... however, the IMF 
considered the content of the Washington Congress as a strategy,” emphasised the 
doyen of Hungarian economics, whose professional stance is undisputed. To put it 
in another way: “In the absence of external financial support, the IMF therapy was 
merely a conceptual economic policy limitation of movement” (Kádár, 2018).
In his monography, Jameson gives a highly convincing diagnosis of the current 
theory of postmodernism: “...one may also wonder, with Adorno, whether ‘in our 
time the commodity has not become its own ideology – that is to say, whether prac-
tices have not replaced rationcination (or rationalisation), and in particular whether 
the practice of consumption has not replaced the resolute taking of a stand and the 
full-throated endorsement of a political opinion. Here too, then, the media meets 
the market and joins hands upon the body of an older kind of intellectual culture” 
(Jameson, 1991, p. 406). A similarly true dramatic assessment claims that “even the 
nation-state itself has ceased to play a central functional and formal role in a process 
that has in a new quantum leap of capital prodigiously expanded beyond them, leav-
ing them behind as ruined and archaic remains of earlier stages in the development 
of this mode of production” (Jameson, 1991, p. 420).
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According to an opinion that has become a firm conviction; the most significant 
international gap in development is that the compromise cooperation between the 
developed North and the feebly developed South, comprising the largest part of the 
world’s population, has become unviable. In the globalising world, the asymmetric 
interdependences between capital exporter and capital importer countries appear 
to be additional principles. The narrowing of national sovereignty over Hungarian 
economy, in other words, giving the decisions determining the future structure of the 
economy into foreign hands leads to the expansion of transnational companies, which 
implement a global business policy through their strategic cooperation and the trans-
fer of goods, capital and technologies. This globalisation has a harmful effect, as it 
erodes national sovereignty, and more specifically, state sovereignty, weakens the gov-
ernment’s offset of the market preponderance. Thus globalisation re-defines the role 
of the nation-state as the efficient manager of the national economy (Szentes, 2002).
It should also be admitted that in the age of globalisation it is the governments’ 
accountability rather than the role of the state that decreases. To a major extent, the 
success of efforts at making the highest possible profit at the lowest cost and without 
risks in the framework of cooperation with transnational companies depends on a 
government’s policy. However, national economies should still make efforts at ensur-
ing that mutually supportive impacts predominate national development.
Consequences of changes in the spatial structure
In the 1990’s, a new concept emerged in social sciences: the supraterritorial space. 
As a new phenomenon, it indicated that something new had evolved in contrast to 
the traditional territorial structures of states. The relationship between the economy 
and law was predominated by the contemporary contractual system of international 
law, which, however, fit to the classic spatial structure, according to a diagnosis by 
József Hargitai, a specialist of the history of diplomacy. After World War I, modern 
international law did not represent a change in the traditional spatial structure of law, 
moreover, the internal development of international law, or if you please, its becom-
ing international and expansion beyond European culture, did not trigger changes in 
the spatial structure (Hargitai, 2004).
If a state is not submitted to the legal rule of another state, it is sovereign. However, 
international law is not include any obligation to maintain sovereignty, thus a state 
may even waive part or whole of its sovereignty, say by joining a federation. “Argumento 
a maiore ad minus it follows from this that it is allowed to waive the partial elements of 
sovereignty, and this process actually takes place whenever a contract is concluded to 
the point where the concept of sovereignty, for example, by accession to the EU, is 
rendered nearly meaningless” (Hargitai, 2004). 
The picture that had evolved by the early 21st century may be summed up as fol-
lows: in the system of international law and the universal treaties appearing in it, the 
state has been caught in the net of obligations that have upset the freedom of inter-
national law from values. The expansion of the modern-age tenet that law can also 
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arise from alternative sources other than legislation is no accident. This law provides 
a framework for the world market structure, and broadly detaches itself nation-state 
or international legislations (Hargitai, 2008). The supporters of the new world order, 
or the postmodern world, proactively urge these processes, and while states are losing 
their previous political, legal and economic powers, other participants, acting in paral-
lel and against the state, simultaneously increase their influence. In addition, multi-
national companies, civil society organisations, initiatives and NGOs also gain enor-
mous influence, and using the globally enforced standards, they generate a peculiar 
“earthquake”. As an example of the application of the so-called transnational law, MC’s 
cross-border organisational structures need to be highlighted, let alone the syndrome 
characterised by the saying “the world is a global assembly line” with the flow of goods 
operated between the various branches and subsidiaries of international companies 
rather than export and import run by nation-states. In addition, as a peculiar develop-
ment, they only obey regulations aimed at maximising profit within their concerns. In 
addition, they typically do not operate according to the law of the place of investment. 
A clear explanation may be given for this distinct emancipation through the fact that 
these companies realise revenues multiple of nation-state budgets.
The 20th century had an endless supply of modalities in “spatial changes”. As an 
example, remember that in the second half of the last century, the aether was still 
subject to regional rights, however, today multinational telecommunication compa-
nies operate according to different rules. The globalised version of this traditional 
space is manifest as a virtual space (Internet). This is because the Internet has ruined 
the legal forms of spatial structure. The cyber space or virtual space is nothing more 
than the set of transactions, relations and ideas created between people and machin-
ery in a communication net. It turned out that the worldwide web was also a scene 
for economic activities, and functions as a symbolic market, with the flow of real-life 
goods and capital. However, the state also discovered the Internet, and wants to use 
increasingly for the modernisation of public administration. The spread of informa-
tion technology also had a special impact: a professional élite has evolved that takes 
action with increasing awareness against governments’ restrictive legislation. Making 
reference primarily to the requirements of human rights, this team is technically well-
versed enough in programming to override areas already regulated by law.
In order to conclude this outline description of the postmodern rule of law, an 
interesting feature is recalled. It is thought-provoking that the traditional forms of 
justice within the frames of nation-states have failed to prove suitable for the effec-
tive enforcement of the legal matters of transnational formations. Thus the enhance-
ment of the role of international arbitration tribunals is no accident. It is conspicuous, 
however, that among the objectives of multinational empires having the power to 
organise, the “termination” of the state is not yet on the agenda. For the time being, it 
seems to be sufficient to change the role of the state according to their interests, after 
all, they need someone to implement the arbitration awards.
To sum up the above, it can be established that the legislative procedures and 
structures regulated on the basis of traditional nation-state constitutions (the hier-
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archy of legal sources and the legal system) are gradually falling apart. This allows 
the conclusion drawn at the end of a succinct and highly expressive study by Preuss 
(1999): The disempowering of state legislators has been implemented. Well, the dep-
rivation of government legislators of their power reached a peak by the establishment 
of the European Union through the gradual expansion of the EEC. The EU came 
into existence by transfer of certain elements of the Member States’ sovereignty and 
based on European values. Actually, sovereignty was the greatest achievement of the 
European civilisation, and the only framework for a viable democracy, claims Thierry 
Baudet with aphoristic wisdom. Due to volume constraints, the theoretical questions 
of the “division of power” between states cannot be discussed here, however, it is 
recommended by all means that sovereignty and the rule of law are complementary 
concepts (Máthé, 2014).
Return to the positivisation of law?
In his monography, Professor Helmut Coing highlights general legal positivism. He 
finds that “...in our age, law is the product of an evolution that from archaic social 
system to ancient high cultures and finally to the modern-day high cultures of our 
current social forms. This evolution is primarily manifest in control over the ever 
increasing complexity. Although law is, on the one hand, supposed to provide secu-
rity for the prevalent regulatory expectation, on the other, it should leave room for 
the development of new structures of expectation and thus the evolution of further 
systems of rules” (Coing, 1996, pp. 87–88). In his opinion of the parallel between 
the normative and cognitive propositions, speaking of the current legal philosophy 
discourse, he specifically gives a criticism of Luhmann’s (1981) theory. The essence of 
Luhmann’s concept is that although positive law comes into existence and is enforced 
through decisions, a static world order has no role in its legitimation, in contrast to 
the foundations laid in the European tradition of classical natural law (Strauss, 1999). 
Positive law should especially be legitimised by the rules of its creation, the political 
procedure of the decisions adopted to select such rules. Classical natural law was the 
reflection of an eternal world order, and the idea of a classical justice presumed an 
overall perfect order of things that could legitimate law and provided criteria for the 
distinction between just and unjust, or lawful and unlawful, when legal decisions were 
made. However, by now it has become clear that under the conditions of our complex 
modern society, this is ruled out. To ensure “an adequate complexity of law”, a “sys-
tem theoretical interpretation” is required to replace it (Coing, 1996). 
In the postmodern world of the 21st century, due, among others, to the above, 
adherence to the requirements of the rule of law is even more indispensable. The 
rule of law is an undoubtedly one of the fundamental values with legal security as its 
guiding principle and law used as a factor of gauging the state. Thus today the rule of 
law is: a constitutional state that regulates the procedure of legislation; a state regulated 
by laws that set limits to individual behaviour, establish government institutions and 
determine their structure and competence; and a state that protects law with the help 
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of appropriate institutions that enforce compliance with the laws. Its characteristics 
also include: submission of the legislator to a constitution; the subjection of judicial 
power to law; the protection of fundamental rights; the accountability of state organi-
sations for compliance with the statutes; the wording of legal orders and the clarity of 
promulgations.
In his monography published in 2018, Canadian professor Jordan B. Peterson 
gives an ingenious characterisation of our age: “The insane and incomprehensible 
postmodern insistence that [...] Society must be altered, or bias eliminated, until all 
outcomes are equitable. […] The fact that both of these cannot logically be true, 
simultaneously, is just ignored (or rationalized away with another appalling post-mod-
ern claim: that logic itself – along with the techniques of science – is merely part of an 
oppressive patriarchal system)” (Peterson, 2018, p. 314). People need principles or 
otherwise chaos pops its ugly head up. Rules, checks and values. “You must determine 
where you are going, so that you can bargain for yourself, so that you don’t end up re-
sentful... [...] Don’t underestimate the power of vision and direction. Define who you 
are” (Peterson, 2018, p. 63). This instruction also made it clear that we must return to 
the starting point of natural law and to the positivisation of law.
The reason is that every historical work exists in a one-off form. Law is part of cul-
ture, it is bound to objects and primarily provides solutions for problems arising an a 
social order. Incontestably, economic power and all other kinds of power have a role 
(or attempt at having a role) in the generation of law. However, the “threads” of cul-
ture are strong, and do not tolerate unilateral settlement (Coing, 1996, pp. 163–164). 
For all these reasons, jurisprudence and its practitioners should have a pivotal role in 
the solution of the problems causing tension in the EU. Jurisprudence belongs to the 
humanities. On the one hand, it serves the practical implementation of the system of 
law, and on the other, it is the discipline of the structures in force. As Edmund Burke 
has put it in his eloquent assessment: “And first of all, the science of jurisprudence, 
the pride of the human intellect, which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, 
is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of original justice with the 
infinite variety of human concerns...” (Coing, 1996, p. 273). 
Controversies in legal literature also characterise our age. As an example of de-
bates on sovereignty, the concept of American researcher Jeremy Rabkin (2004) is 
highlighted, who agues that the global order must also be based on the sovereignty 
of states (Máthé, 2013, pp. 160–161). The reason is that these are the unique interna-
tional factors that unify democratic legitimation through the enforcement capability 
of statutes. Let alone that, on the basis of unanimous intent, economic areas and re-
gional centres may be established between the individual sovereigns, for instance, in 
the EU, on areas created by mutual will, within or beyond the borders.
Thus the above may well be the 21st-century priorities in the theory of the state, 
providing focus for the transformation of the entire organisation and decision-mak-
ing mechanism of the European Union, based on the common currency and intend-
ed to be operated by the core Member States, not in adjustment to globalisation, but 
to “several world-economies operating at the same time”, as Fernand Braudel (2008) 
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aptly put it. Within Europe, various regions of shared value may be established. This 
is because the peculiarities of historical regions coincide with the current economic 
trends seen in the EU (Szűcs, 1983).
The changing role of the Constitutional Court
The peculiar challenges of a comparison of the European legal system are of para-
mount significance in both legal and political terms, writes Armin von von Bogdandy, 
Director of the Max Planck Institute of Heidelberg in the sixth volume of his high-
standard Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum, about constitutional justice. The reason 
for this special attention is that uniquely in the public law of the European Union, 
the primary law of the Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
national laws are interconnected. European public law reconciles this with systems 
that identify as being based on constitutional rules without blending it into a single 
legal system. Giving an analysis of the role and practice of constitutional courts and 
through the conclusions drawn from them, the authors of the volume make it clear 
that this institution may be the ultimate guarantee for the elimination of the anoma-
lies in the postmodern rule of law (Bogdandy et al., 2016, VII.).
The basis of the European legal system is the area, defined by the laws of the EU 
Member States, where the regulations of both the Member States and the EU are en-
forced. This confirms professor Bogdandy’s proposition that a complex legal system 
without a sophisticated set of doctrines usually lacks clarity, predictability and honesty 
(Máthé, 2017). And when the drafters of the Treaty of the European Union speak of 
an “area”, they mean the full spectrum of interpretations of positive law. 
It can be ascertained that constitutional justice is the theoretical basis of compari-
son within the European legal system, and this role is the pillar of association between 
constitutional courts. Instead of an interpretation of a clearly designated legal area, 
the current practice of constitutional courts is far more a kind of “inbuilt” legislative 
procedure specially focussed on interrelationships. As a result, Bogdandy and his co-
authors distinguish five special functions for the constitutional courts operating in the 
association: interconnection and implementation; translation; legitimation; closing 
gaps in legal protection and interfacing the law of the European Union and consti-
tutional law. Special significance is attached to closing gaps in legal protection, and 
more specifically, the role in identity control and in ultra vires control, undertaken to 
protect the system against the EU’s organisations exceeding their authorities. This 
control is pivotal because it deepens and streamlines the elaboration of common Eu-
ropean solutions. The Association of Constitutional Courts also contributes greatly 
to the development of the European legal system by controlling the activities of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights 
in horizontal cooperation with the courts of the Member States. For this reason, in 
resolving the problems in the current jurisprudence it can be considered as a forward-
looking axiom that European culture and European public law may not be rooted 
solely in the law of the European Union and in the settled case-law of the European 
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Court of Human Rights. This rather requires the creation of a network of the national 
organisations of jurisdiction (Bogdandy et al., 2016, pp. 8–10).
The authors of the book decline the concept of a standard model for the constitu-
tional courts of the European states, and any effort made at it, and giving an analysis 
of the test of the Treaty of the European Union, they provide evidence that the equiva-
lence of the Member States’ constitutional systems implies the recognition of “diverse 
mechanisms” that protect the rules-based nature of the constitution (Bogdandy et 
al., 2016, pp. 13–16). Areference is rightly made to the charter of the Conference of 
European Constitutional Courts, which assigns the judicial review of constitutional-
ity, judicial independence, the basic principles of the democratic rule of law and the 
protection of human rights into the competence of the court (Bogdandy et al., 2016, 
pp. 16–17). Regarding the future of this sui generis formation, the excellent experts 
refer to the quality of argumentation about doctrines in jurisprudence as to a man-
datory parable. They find that as a legal guidance, the basic rules-based structure of 
European public law expects all the stakeholders of the legal system to operate along 
common knowledge, abilities and values despite the fact that they do not form a ho-
mogeneous legal culture. In legal practice and in the theory of law, national interpre-
tations and the content of their doctrines should be examined from the perspective of 
public law, but there is no need to always endeavour for harmonisation, as there is no 
general consensus in the jurisprudential and practical local value of the legal acts and 
configurations included in legal systems In our opinion, the function of comparing 
constitutional jurisdiction can be classified into the following three types: the verifi-
cation of a statement; the setting up of a conceptual framework implying a certain 
statement; and contraposition. As in a pluralistic structure, shared responsibility can 
only be enforced in the form of a dialogue, a comparative assessment may exist as the 
building block for the unfolding of common rules-based legislation (Bogdandy et al., 
2016, pp. 18–20). This method may, in turn, especially justify the resolution of the le-
gal conflict between the common organisations of the EU and the nation-states as the 
system of the association of constitutional courts reaches its full potential.
Closing thoughts
The intellectual challenge makes it clear for all of us that legal decisions need to be 
adopted in professional issues as soon as possible. Let us recall once again the wise ideas 
of Jordan B. Peterson, as the professor’s recommendations bear close consideration: 
“We must make decisions, here and now, even though the best means and the best goals 
can never be discerned with certainty. [...] Some reliance on tradition can help us estab-
lish our aims. It is reasonable to do what other people have always done, unless we have 
a very good reason not to. [...] To tell the truth is to bring the most habitable reality into 
Being. [...] Truth [...] makes nations wealthy and safe. [...] Truth makes the past truly 
past... [...] Apprehend your personal truth. Communicate it carefully, in an articulate 
manner, to yourself and others. [...] This will ensure the benevolence of the future, 
diverging as it might from the certainties of the past” (Peterson, 2018, pp. 221–230).
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